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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Record

SUBJECT : Discussions with Representatives of OSO and OPC Concerning the Current Communist Charges that the UN Forces in Korea are Engaging in Biological Warfare

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25X1A9a 1. On 6 March 1952, [redacted] of this office discussed subject question with Messrs. [redacted]
25X1A9a [redacted] FE Division, OPC.

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2. All the above people interviewed were completely deadpan and gave no clue whatsoever that they were concealing operational information. Their reactions, therefore, could reflect one of the following: (a) they skillfully concealed operational information of their own; (b) they concealed knowledge of the operations of others; or (c) they actually had no operational information to conceal. It is [redacted] guess that (c) above is the most likely. [redacted] stated that, although OPC had in the past taken up Communist propaganda themes and then overplayed and distorted them by black means, OPC was not at present so engaged with the subject Communist propaganda theme.

3. The OSO representatives stated that, although they had had since November, 1951, a number of scattered reports from their sources concerning epidemics in North Korea, available intelligence did not indicate the actual existence of any such large-scale epidemics.

25X1A9a a. [redacted] stated that OSO Washington had in the last week asked the field to forward at once all information it might have concerning the presence, if any, of epidemics, details of the Communist propaganda campaign, and the field's evaluation of this campaign. The field has not replied to date. [redacted] promised to telephone our office if any significant data were received.

b. The OSO people had no guess as to whether the Communist campaign might possibly presage some ominous new development in the Korean war.

25X1A9a 4. [redacted] theory on the Communist propaganda effort is as follows. It could possibly portend some new development, but this is unlikely. Rather, it is probably another in a series of recent Communist moves to bolster their bargaining position at Panmunjom, distort the picture of the US held by allied and neutralist governments and peoples, and, most importantly, prolong indefinitely the Korean negotiations.

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